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INTRODUCTION
The case of Bischel v. Memtt. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) (a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit F) is directly on point in this case, and sets the precedent this
Court must follow in overturning the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.
Defendants are well aware of this fact, and have spared no effort in their attempt to
distinguish this case from Bischel. In so doing. Defendants have distorted the facts, cited
inapplicable law and tried to distract this Court from the clear issues and the clear legal
principles applicable to those issues.
Through this reply brief. Plaintiff wishes to get the case back on track.
ARGUMENT
APPLICATION OF THE CONTROLLING LEGAL
PRINCIPLES TO THE RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS
MANDATES REVERSAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
In their opposition brief. Defendants have chosen to ignore the central, relevant point
that a Plaintiff complies with the notice of claim mandates of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act when that Plaintiffs counsel serves the notice of claim precisely as instructed
by the government. Instead. Defendants have chosen to nibble around the edges of this, the
only issue that really makes any difference in this case. To that end. Defendants have
dragged several red herrings across the Court's path, apparently hoping to lure the Court's
attention away from this central issue.
Each of these red herrines will be discussed in turn below. Each is meritless.
As to Defendant's argument that the Risk Management Division is not the Attorney
GeneraVs office:
In their brief. Defendants have gone to great lengths to pound home the point in
every way imaginable that the Risk Management Division is not the Attorney General's
office. They cite Utah case law to the effect that instead of being the Attorney General's
office, the Risk Management office can only be considered an "agency concerned" under
the notice of claim statute as it existed at the time of the filing of the notice oi' claim in this
case. (Opposition Brief, p. 7). They point out that under the statute as it currently stands
(and new case law interpreting the new statute), service of a notice o( claim on the Risk
Management division cannot stand as an acceptable substitute for service on the Attorney
General's office. (Opposition Brief, pp. 6, 7). Apparently. Defendants believe that by
repeating over and over that the Risk Management Division is not the Attorney General's
office and the Attorney General's office is not the Risk Management office, a relevant point
has somehow been made.
They are wrong in this belief.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Risk Management Division is not the Attorney
General's office. Plaintiff is not arguing that the Risk Management Division is the Attorney
General's office, instead. Plaintiff's argument goes to the relevant issue in this case: Where
a plaintiffs counsel has been directed by a representative of the State to file the notice of
claim intended to go to the Attorney General with some other office - regardless of what
that office may be - he complies with the governmental immunity act by following that
direction.
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs counsel's paralegal was directed by a
representative of the State to file the notice of claim with the Risk Management office. (R.
129: Affidavit of Barbara Reissen. attached hereto as Exhibit G). It is further undisputed
that the paralegal was told that the Risk Management office was a division of the Attorney
General's office. (R. 129). It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs counsel did exactly as his
paralegal was instructed. (R. 132. 136. 138-139). Under the clear principles of the Bischel
case. Plaintiff thus complied with the notice of claim requirement of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
No better analogy to this situation exists than in the game of basketball. In
basketball, the rules mandate that a defensive player may not thwart the offensive team's
attempt to score a basket by deflecting or scooping the basketball out of the basket just as
the ball is about to go in. The penalty for this infraction of the rules, called "goaltending." is
to award the offensive team the points that would have been scored had the basket been
consummated instead of unfairly thwarted by the defensive player. Because it is the
defensive player's infraction of the rules that prevented the basketball from going into the
basket, he cannot legitimately argue that no score should be awarded because, after all. the
basket was never made. To the contrary, it is futile for the defensive player to holler. "But
the ball didn't go into the basket! They shouldn't get any points!" That's not the point. Of
course the ball didn't go into the basket. The player unfairly prevented it from going into
the basket, in violation of the rules. The defensive team cannot profit from the wrongful
action of one of its players.
Similarly, the policy and rules applicable to the filing of notices of claim prevent the
State from misdirecting Plaintiff's counsel as to where a notice should be filed and then
profiting from this wrongful action. "One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a
false sense of security, thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be
heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought." Rice v. Granite
School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969).
Here, the fact that the Risk Management Division is not the Attorney General's
office is not the determinative point as to whether Plaintiff complied with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements. The determinative point is
that Plaintiffs counsel did exactly as instructed by the State's representative Defendants'
"but it's the wrong office" defense avails no more than does a basketball .cam's "but it
didn't go into the basket we were goaltending" argument.
As to Defendants *authorized representative ofthe state" argument:
In their opposing brief, Defendants argue that the person to whom Plaintiffs
counsel's paralegal spoke is "an unnamed lay person who was not employed by the office of
the Attorney General." (See Opposition Brief, p. 4). Thus, Defendants conclutle. the Bischel
case does not apply at all to this case. Instead, Defendants argue, this case more resembles
the case of Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp,. 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). in which the
Plaintiffs notice of appeal was not sent to any of the correct governmental agencies, but
was instead served on outside counsel for Salt Lake City Corporation. (In Bellonio. the
Plaintiff never received instructions from any representative of any governmental agency as
to where to file the notice of claim, but simply sent it out to several government offices,
apparently hoping that the notices would find their way to the correct parties).
In this regard. Defendants have misstated both the facts and the law.
The uncontroverted evidence is that Plaintiffs counsel's paralegal called the
Attorney General's office for the express purpose of finding out how to serve the Attorney
General's office in a situation in which there was ongoing communication between
Plaintiffs counsel and the Risk Management Division, which has a full-time assistant
Attorney General on the premises. (R. 129. R. 138-139). It is further undisputed that in
direct response to her inquiry, the paralegal was referred to the Risk Management Division.
(R. 129). It is also undisputed that the person to whom the paralegal spoke at the Risk
Management Division stated that this office was a division of the Attorney General's office.
(R. 129; see Exhibit G attached hereto). As pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief, this
Court must accept these uncontroverted facts as true for purposes of determining whether
Plaintiffs complaint was properly dismissed. See Bischel. 907 P.2d at 281. dissent footnote
1; Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 at 802 (Utah 1985). The Court should also
construe all reasonable inferences from these facts in Plaintiff's favor. Heiner v. S.J. Groves
& Sons. 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp..
811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1994).
As important as the facts that have been adduced are the facts that have not been
adduced.
For example, contrary to Defendants' assertions, there is no evidence that the person
to whom the paralegal spoke was not an employee of the Attorney General's office, and is
thus the unsophisticated "lay person" characterized by Defendants. To the contrary, the
uncontroverted evidence as to what was told to the paralegal - that the Risk Management
office was a division of the Attorney General's office, that the notice o( claim should be
directed to the Risk Management office, and that the notice of claim should be directed to
Mr. Sefandonakis in particular - all give rise to the reasonable inference that the person was
either employed by the Attorney General's office or acting as an agent of that office in
giving instructions to the paralegal. At the very least, the fact that the Attorney General1 s
staff transferred the paralegal to this person for specific instructions as to how and where to
file the notice of claim certainly indicates that for all intents and purposes, this was the
Attorney General's agent \'or the purpose of giving such instructions.
Under these circumstances, Defendants can hardly argue in good faith that Plaintiffs
counsel was somehow randomly dialing numbers in the state directory in hope of finding
some unsophisticated rube on whom he could rely for sending a notice of claim to the
wrong place. To the contrary. Plaintiffs counsel specifically sought help from the Attorney
General's office, received instructions from a person who verified that the office from
which that person was speaking was a division of the Attorney General's office, and
followed those instructions to the letter. It would be hard to find a better case to which the
holding of the Bischel case should be applied.
Defendants' argument in this regard is disingenuous at best. If Plaintiff could show
beyond any doubt that the person to whom the paralegal spoke was an employee of the
Attorney General's office, one can hardly imagine that this would somehow act as the end
of the inquiry for Defendants. Instead. Defendants would be arguing that such a person was
somehow not authorized to give instructions on filing notices of claim or that the Attorney
General's office cannot reasonably be held to answer for the mistakes of one of its low-level
employees. Defendants might argue that unless the notice of claim made its way directly
into the Attorney General's hands, its service still did not comply with the statute. Perhaps
Defendants would simply rely on the "but they filed it in the wrong office" argument
discussed above. In any case, it is extremely doubtful that Defendants would simply fold
their tent and walk away, defeated without a fight. Defendants "unsophisticated lay person
"argument is a valiant, but ultimately meritless attempt to make that fight. This Court
should not take it seriously.
As to Defendants' "estoppel"argument.
Defendants argue that if this Court finds that Plaintiff complied with the notice of
claim statute by doing exactly what her counsel was instructed to do by the State's
representative, such will somehow amount to a form of prohibited estoppel against the
government. Defendants argue that following the Bischel case would somehow offend the
general principle that one cannot assert estoppel against the government.
This argument is nonsensical, of course. This Court need not resort to general
principles of estoppel in order to determine whether the holding o( the Bischel case should
be followed in this case. Instead, this Court need only look to the Bischel case itself.
Neither Bischel nor any of the other notice of claim cases stand for the proposition that a
plaintiff whose counsel was specifically misdirected as to the filing of a notice of claim is
somehow barred from asserting compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act on the
general principle that one cannot assert estoppel against the government. Quite the opposite
is true. Bischel stands specifically for the proposition that a governmental employee with
apparent authority to act on behalf of the requisite governmental office cannot misdirect a
plaintiff as to the filing of a notice of claim and thereafter successfully defend against the
claim on the basis that the notice was served on the wrong office. Estoppel is not the issue
here. Simple fairness and decency are the issues. The government cannot use the "non-
estoppel" argument as either a sword to mistreat its citizens nor as a shield against its
citizens' legitimate complaints about its mistreatment, at least as far as instructions on filing
a notice of claim are concerned.1
Even if general estoppel principles were at issue here. Plaintiff should still prevail in
this case. Here, it is obvious that Plaintiff acted with "reasonable prudence and diligence"
in relying on the State's representations, and that an obvious injustice will occur if Plaintiff
is not allowed to go forward. Of course, it should go without saying that not only would
public policy not be adversely affected by allowing Plaintiff to proceed, but. to the contrary,
the public policy that the State cannot abuse its citizens nor their legal representatives would
be advanced. Application of general estoppel principles in this case offends no general nor
specific public policy against asserting estoppel against the State. Instead, this is a case in
which the specific exceptions to that general policy should apply. See Consolidated Coal v.
Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 1994); Morgan v. Board of State Uinds. 549
P.2d 695 (Utah 1976).
As to Defendants' "magic words" and "one notice of claim" argument:
Defendants argue that in this case, "the error comes from the paralegal acting as if
only one notice of claim, and not two. were involved." (See Opposition Brief, p. 11). They
; Defendant incorrectly asserts that "the plaintiff relies upon the fact that a claim adjuster
from Risk Management handled her claims for PIP benefits without benefit of a notice of
claim and without indicating that such was necessary." apparently as an excuse to cite
this court's holding in Neel v. State. 854 P.2d 581 (UtahCt. App. 1993). which held that
a notice of claim need not be filed before a plaintiff may seek PIP benefits from the State.
Plaintiff has never made such a contention, and does not do so now. There exists no
reason for the Court to look so far afield as the Neel case for direction here. The Bischel
precedent clearly applies here.
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then state, "Plaintiff's agent did not inquire, as did the plaintiff in Bischel, as to how to
serve the appropriate governing body, but rather for instructions on whom to serve a notice
of claim on."
Although difficult to decipher, it is apparently Defendants' argument that because the
paralegal did not say the magic words, "how should 1 serve the appropriate governing
body," Defendants are somehow off the hook in giving her the wrong instructions. It is also
apparently Defendants' position that Plaintiffs counsel was under the erroneous impression
that he needed to serve only one notice of claim - on the "agency concerned" - instead of
two notices of claim - on both the "agency concerned" and the Attorney Generals office.
Both of these arguments are ridiculous.
First of all, it is uncontroverted that the paralegal called the Attorney General's office
for the specific purpose of determining how to serve the Attorney General in accordance
with the requisites of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act Notice of Claim Statute. (R.
129). She was not asking how to serve the "governing body" because she was not trying to
find out how to serve the "governing body." She was seeking specifically how to serve the
Attorney General's office and was told that the Risk Management Division was a division
of the Attorney General's office and that the notice of claim should be sent there. (R. 129).
Secondly, at all times the paralegal and Mr. Hart, plaintiffs counsel, knew that two
notices of claim were necessary (contrary to Defendants' assertion that the paralegal acted
"as if only one notice of claim, and not two, were involved"). Defendants have aeain
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simply misstated the facts. It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff's counsel filed two notices of
claim, both of which complied with the statute. (See Exhibits H and I hereto: R. 69. 72).
The first notice was sent to the "agency concerned." Utah State University. Thus, the
second notice of claim, directed to the Risk Management Department, was not intended to
fill the "agency concerned" requisite. That requisite was fulfilled with the filing of the first
notice of claim. The second notice of claim was intended to fulfill the requirement of
service on the Attorney General. For the reasons set forth in detail above, that second notice
of claim fulfilled that requirement. Two notices were required. Two notices were sent.
Defendants' assertion that the paralegal acted as if "only one notice of claim, and not two,
were involved." is thus simply false, and appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead the
Court..
As to Defendants' "no harm, no foul"argument.
Finally. Defendants concede that the Court based its decision to dismiss on an
erroneous reading of the Setandonakis affidavit. Nonetheless, the Defendants believe this is
no big deal because this obvious error is somehow irrelevant to the question of whether the
notices of claim were validly filed.
The Court's error is a big deal indeed, however. As pointed out in Plaintiffs
Opening Brief, justice and equity required that the district court reconsider and change its
decision to dismiss Plaintiffs ease once it became aware that its understanding of the facts
from the Setandonakis affidavit was incorrect and that the facts were, indeed, exactlv
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opposite to what the court had understood. See U.R.C.P. 60(b). In addition, the totality of
all the facts, including the uncontroverted testimony of the paralegal and Mr. Hart, when
considered in light of a correct understanding of Mr. Sefandonakis' affidavit, should have
led the district court to conclude that the Plaintiff had complied with the requirements of the
notice of claim statute.
Obviously, it is difficult for a trial court to reconsider an earlier decision and admit
that it was wrong and should change that decision. Nonetheless, when justice and fairness
so require, it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to do so. Such is the case
where the court has made an obvious mistake of law having to do with the sufficiency of
service of a plaintiffs notice of claim. Bischel. supra, at 277; Udy v. Ud\\ 893 P.2d 1097
(Utah App. 1995).
This is hardly a case of "no harm, no foul." It is instead a case of obvious judicial
error, a mistake of law that deprived Plaintiff of her chance to have her day in court.
Defendants' "no harm, no foul" argument must thus be rejected.
CONCLUSION
A correct application of the controlling law to the uncontroverted facts in this case
mandate that this Court overturn the trial court's decision to dismiss Plaintiffs case.
Plaintiffs counsel directed and delivered Plaintiffs notice of claim precisely as instructed
by a representative of the State - a representative with apparent if not actual authority of the
Attorney General's office. It is not acceptable for the State to now argue that Plaintiff failed
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to comply with the notice of claim statute under these circumstances. The public deserves
consistent, credible treatment from its servants at all levels of government.
Defendants' "red herrings" should be seen for what they are. and this Court should
not be diverted thereby. This Court should thus overturn the district court's dismissal of
Plaintiff's case and remand the case for further proceedings on the merits.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiff requests that this Court hold oral argument in this matter.
REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION OF OPINION
Plaintiff requests that this Court publish its opinion in this case. Plaintiff believes
that such publication will be of value to the bar in general and to governmental practitioners
in particular with regard to the service of notices of claim.
DATED this £4- day of (Xm^ahC , 2000.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C.
By: t^^LatJl IC&L-iAXM^y^
Randall K. Edwards
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff
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Caren BISCHEL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Heather J. MERRITT and Salt Lake County, et ah,
Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 940559-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 30, 1995.
Motorist sued county, alleging that she suffered
personal injuries in automobile accident caused by
county employee. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted
county's motion to dismiss due to plaintiff's failure to
file notice of claim in accordance with Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that notice of
claim was sufficient, even though it was addressed to
county attorney, rather than to county commission.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., issued dissenting opinion.
1. JUDGMENT <§=^384
228
22SIX Opening or Vacating
223k384 Form and requisites of application in
general.
Utah App. 1995.
Where plaintiff labeled her motion to set aside trial
court's orce: of dismissal as motion for new trial, but
where plaintiff filed that motion more than ten days
after entry- of judgment because she did not receive
timely notice of judgment, trial court properly
considered motion as one for relief from judgment.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 59, 60.
2. MOTIONS <§= 15
267 —-
267kl2 Form and Requisites
267kl5 Entitling.
Utah App. 1995.
It is substantive motion, not caption, that is
controlling.
3. APPEAL AND ERROR 3^982(1 J
30 - —
30XVI Review
30XYI('H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order
Page 1
30k982(l) In general
[See headnote text below]
3. JUDGMENT <£=355
228 —-
228LX Opening or Vacating
228k353 Errors and Irregularities
228k355 Errors of law.
Utah App. 1995.
Trial courts have discretion to determine whether
mistake of law existed, and whether setting aside of
judgment would thus be warranted, and Court of
Appeals will reverse only if there has been abuse of
that discretion. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
4. COUNTIES <s^213
104 —-
304X11 Actions
104k211 Conditions Precedent
104k213 Presentation of claim.
Utah App. 1995.
Plaintiffs notice of claim to recover for personal
injury she sustained in automobile accident caused by
county employee satisfied requirements of Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, even though notice of
claim was addressed to county attorney, rather than to
county commission; statute was generally silent about
how notice should be filed with governing body, both
county commission and county attorney informed
plaintiff that notice should be filed with county
attorney, notice was timely, and filing notice with
county attorney facilitated settlement discussions.
U.C.A.1953, 60-30-13.
5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <@=>741.10
268
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k74I Notice or Presentation of Claims for
Injury
268k74LI0 In general.
Utah App. 1995.
Utah courts have established rule of strict
compliance with notice provisions of Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A. 1953,
60-30-13.
*276 Samuel King and Harold J. Dent, Jr., Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Douglas R. Short, Salt Lake County Attorney, and
Michael E Postma, Denutv County Attorney, Salt
Copyrieht (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
907 P.2d 275, Bischel v. Merritt, (Utah App. 1995)
Lake City, for Appellees.
Before ORME, P.J., and BENCH and JACKSON,
JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judse:
Caren Bischel appeals the trial court's denial of her
motion to set aside an order dismissing her personal
injury action. Salt Lake County prevailed below on
its motion to dismiss Bischel's action for failure lo file
a notice of claim in accordance with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
On February 1, 1993, Heather J. Merritt, a Salt
Lake County employee, caused an automobile
accident in which Bischel was allegedly injured. On
April 22, 1993, Bischel prepared a notice of claim
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993) and
called the Salt Lake County Commission to determine
how and with whom the notice of claim should be
filed. Bischel was told to send the notice to Trish
McDonald at the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
Bischel then called McDonald, who confirmed the
instructions and provided the proper address for the
notice. Bischel sent the notice by certified mail and
received a return receipt signed by McDonald.
McDonald and other county employees subsequently
negotiated the claim with Bischel. In May 1993, the
county issued a $680 check for property damage to
Bischel's vehicle. By January 1994, however,
Bischel's personal injury claim had not been settled,
and she filed the present action. Salt Lake County
then moved to dismiss Bischel's lawsuit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the claim was not
preserved as required by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13
(1993). The County based its motion to dismiss on
the single fact that Bischel's notice of claim was
addressed to McDonald rather man to the County
Commission.
[I] The trial court granted the County's motion.
The County, however, failed to give Bischel timely
notice of the entry of judgment. See Utah
RJud.Admin. 4-504(4) (1995). Once she received
the trial court's *277 order of dismissal, Bischel
filed a motion to set aside that order. (FN1) Bischel
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now challenges the trial court's denial of her rule
60(b) motion.
NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT
|2] [3] Bischel argues the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to recognize a mistake and
set aside its order. The County responds the irial
court made no mistake of law and therefore did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside its original
order of dismissal. Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial
court may relieve a party of a judgment in case of
mistake. (FN2) A judicial error or "mistake of law
by the trial court may support a Rule 60(b) motion."
Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1995).
Trial courts have discretion to determine whether a
mistake of law existed, and we will reverse only if
there has been an abuse of that discretion. Id. Under
the facts of the present case, we conclude a mistake of
law existed; therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied Bischel's rule 60(b) motion.
[4] The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides
that
[ajny person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against an employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance of
his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
... The notice of claim shall be ... directed and
delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12
or 63-30-13.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993) (emphasis
added). The requirements of section 63-30-13 simply
provide that
[a] claim against a political subdivision, or against
its employee for an act or omission occurring during
the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice of claim ts filed with the governing
body of the political subdivision within one year
after the claim arises.
Id. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added). Under these
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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sections, plaintiffs must give timely notice to the
governing body of a county to maintain an action
agamst that county.
It is undisputed that Bischel sent a certified notice of
claim to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and
that the County Attorney's Office accepted that
notice. Tne trial court concluded Bischel's formal
complaint was barred because Bischel failed to frie a
proper notice of claim in compliance with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. To determine the
accuracy of the trial court's legal conclusion, we must
determine what filing a notice of claim with the
governing body practically requires of citizens with
claims against political subdivisions of the state. See
Brittain v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Employment
"278 Sec. 882 P.2d 666, 669-70 (Utah App. 1994).
(FN3)
The statute does not prescribe a specific manner or
method for filing notice with the governing body of
the political subdivision. Whereas requirements for
the form and content of the notice of claim are
specifically articulated in the statute, see Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-11(3) (1993), requirements for direction
and delivery of the notice must be inferred from the
phrase, "notice of claim is filed with the governing
body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises." Id. § 63-30-13. In other words,
although the time requirement is clearly expressed,
the statute is generally silent about how notice should
be filed with the governing body. Furthermore, the
County has not articulated any policy or specific
procedure for citizens to file notice of civil claims.
Because the statute does not prescribe specific
procedures for direction and delivery of the notice of
claim, we will interpret section 63-30-13 "in a
manner consistent with the overall purpose of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act." (FN4) Brittain.
882 P.2d at 670. "It is necessary to consider the
policy of the notice requirement so that in any
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine
if the intent of the statute has been accomplished...."
Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah
1980k
"[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible public
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for
costly and unnecessary litigation."
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Brittain. 882 P.2d at 671 (quoting Stahl. 618 P.2d
at 4S2). Filing notice "tends to minimize the
difficulties that may arise due to changes in
administrations" and "protects against the passage of
time obscuring memory and distorting a plaintiff's
recollection of the events which are at the heart of the
claim." Id. at 671.
In the present case, Bischel, not finding explicit
instructions in the statute but wanting to ensure her
notice was directed and delivered correctly, called the
County Commission and was instructed to send the
notice to Trish McDonald in the County Attorney's
office. Bischel took the further step of confirming the
County Commission's instruction with McDonald.
McDonald agreed she was the proper person to
receive the notice and even provided the address
where the notice should be filed. Thus, McDonald
verified her apparent authority to receive the notice
on behalf of the County Commission.
McDonald's instruction to Bischel was certainly
reasonable given that the County Attorney's staff
investigates and negotiates civil claims against the
County. Bischel had no reason to question such a
sensible instruction. Bischel's notice enabled the
County to investigate the claim and to move toward
settlement. Bischel's notice also memorialized the
events at the heart of her claim. Bischel thus fulfilled
the purpose of the notice requirement by filing notice
of her claim with the designated person in the Counrv
Attorney's Office.
Considering the duties and authority delegated to the
County Attorney's Office, it is evident that the
governmental entity entrusted with investigating and
settling or defending the claim received the requisite
notice well within the one-year period imposed by the
statute. Directing and delivering her notice of claim
to the County Attorney's Office in no way inhibited
settling Bischel's claim without resort to litigation. In
fact, given the powers and responsibilities the County-
has bestowed upon the County Attorney's *279
Office, the opposite is true. See id. at 672. Filing
notice with the County Attorney's Office facilitated
settlement discussions. Indeed, the Countv
Attorney's Office actively pursued settlement of
Bischel's claim, even paying her property damage.
[5] Utah courts have established a rule of strict
compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. See, e.g.. Yates v.
Vernal Family Health Or., 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah
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1980); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep'i of Transp.. 828
P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App.1992). Our holding today
is consistent with that rule. The present case is not
one in which a plaintiff gave no notice, see. e.g.,
Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983),
or in which a plaintiff filed only one of the two
required notices, see, e.g., Lamarr, 828 P.2d at
540-41. This case is also not one in which the notice
of claim was defective in form or content, see, e.g..
Cox v. Utah Mortgage & Loan Corp.. 716 P.2d 783,
786 (Utah 1986), or in which notice of claim was not
filed within the one-year period, see, e.g.. Richards
v. Leavitt. 716 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1985) (per
curiam). As required by the statute, Bischel gave the
County notice of claim; Bischel's notice complied
with the statute's form and content requirements; and
Bischel's notice was timely filed. Bischel therefore
strictly complied with the statute and with the County
Commission's instructions.
In sum, because Bischel directed and delivered her
notice precisely as instructed by the statute and the
County Commission, her notice was adequate.
Further, because her notice and the ensuing lawsuit
were timely filed, the trial court's refusal to set aside
its dismissal must be reversed. Bischel must be given
the opportunity to pursue her claim. (FN5) It appears
at best disingenuous for the County to argue that
Bischel's notice was inadequate merely because she
directed and delivered it as the County Commission
and County Attorney's Office instructed. The public
deserves more consistent, more credible treatment
from its servants.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Bischel's notice of claim met the
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. We therefore conclude the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to find a mistake of law
under rule 60(b)(1) and denied Bischel's motion to set
aside its earlier judgment. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's order and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ORME. P.J., concurs.
BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
Had Bischel filed a timely appeal from the judgment
of dismissal, we would have to reach the issue of
whether she filed a timely notice of claim with "the
governing body" as required by Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-13 (1993). However, Bischel did not appeal
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the judgment of dismissal. She appeals only Jie
denial of her post-judgment motion. See main opinion
at notes 1 and 2.
"The trial court is afforded broad discretion in
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b), and its determination will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v.
Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989).
Insofar as Bischel's post-judgmeni motion can be
construed to be a 60(b) motion, the trial court acted
within its discretion in denying the motion. To hold
otherwise is to effectively allow a 60(b) motion to
stay the time for appealing the underlying judgment.
Utah courts have consistently held that a 60(b) motion
does not stay the time for appealing a judgment. Lord
v. Lord, 709 P.2d 338, n. 1 (Utah 1985) (per curiam)
(stating thai "[rjule 60(b) motions do not toll the time
for appeai."); Peay v. Pray, 607 P.2d 841, 842 (Utah
1980) (explaining that rule 600?) motion does not
extend time for filing notice of appeal); Holbrook v.
Hodson. 24 Utah 2d 120, 122 n. 2, 466 P.2d 843, 845
n. 2 (1970) (same); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d
277, 280, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (1955) (same); see also
UtahR.App.P. 4(b).
*280 In her post-judgment motion, Bischel
reargued and restated the same arguments she had
made in opposing the motion to dismiss. No new
information was provided, nor were any new
arguments made. The trial court held that Bischel
"failed to articulate sufficient reasons justifying
relief," and denied the post-judgment motion. That
ruling is within the broad discretion of the trial court.
Even if we could get beyond the procedural defect
discussed above, the main opinion fails to follow
controlling precedent in discussing "he merits of the
case. The main opinion erroneously relies upon
Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) to
divine the meaning of the "governing body" provision
of section 63-30-13. Brittain, however, involved a
different statute.
In Brittain, the plaintiff had been injured at a Job
Service building in Provo, Utah. This court was
interpreting section 63-30-12, which requires notice to
be filed with the Attorney General's office and die
"agency concerned" in any action against the state.
The plaintiff properly served notice upon the Attorney
General's office but instead of also serving notice
upon Job Service or the Division of Facilities
Construction and Management, the plaintiff sent
notice to Lie Division of Risk Management. At trial,
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the State succeeded on its motion to dismiss for
failure to file notice with the "agency concerned," and
the plaintiff appealed. To interpret "agency
concerned," this court relied on the dictionary
definition of "concerned" as including those who are
"interested." The court concluded that "interested"
included the Division of Risk Management since it
ultimately handled such claims. Id. at 671.
However, this type of interpretation is inappropriate
in construing the "governing body" provision of
section 63-30-13. In construing that section, the Utah
Supreme Court has previously indicated that the
governing body of a county is the county commission.
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr., 617 P.2d 352,
354 (Utah 1980). In Yates, the supreme court
expressly held that a complaint against a county was
properly dismissed because plaintiff did not give
timely notice to the county commission. Id.
Bischel did not serve any notice on the Salt Lake
County Commission. Bischel also failed to establish,
by competent evidence, that she had followed the
county commission's instructions as to how to file a
notice of claim. She presented no sworn statement
trom a member of the county commission or any
employee of the commission. She did not even secure
a sworn statement from Trish McDonald. (FN1)
Merely claiming that some unidentified person told
her where and how to file her claim is not enough to
withstand the strict filing requirements of the
Governmental Immunity Act. See Lamarr v. Utah
State Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah
App. 1992). Bischel has failed to meet her burden of
showing that the county commission, in some way,
waived those strict notice requirements.
Implicit in the main opinion's decision is that
because of what an unidentified commission employee
allegedly told Bischel's attorney, the county
commission should now be estopped from holding
Bischel to the strict requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act. It is, however, very difficult to estop
the government. See Utah State Univ. v. Sutro &
Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). Only •well-
substantiated representations" by a governmental
entity will suffice. Anderson v. Public Ser.\
Comm'n. S39 P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). To estop a
governmental entity, its representations must
generally take the form of a written statement by an
authorized person. Id. at 827; Celebrity Club, Inc.
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689,
694-95 (Utah 1979); Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671. 675-76 (Utah
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App. 1990).
There is clearly no written statement in this case.
Bischel has not even identified the commission
employee who allegedly told her to file her notice
with the county attorney. Under those circumstances,
the county commission cannot be estopped from
holding Bischel *281. to the strict notice provisions
of the Governmental Immunity Act.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm.
FN1. We note that Bischel labeled her motion to set
aside the trial court's order of dismissal as being
made pursuant to rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, Bischel filed the
motion more than ten days after entry of judgment
because she did not receive timely notice of the
judgment from the County. The trial court thus
properly considered the motion under rule 60 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than under
rule 59. See Utah R.Civ.P. 59; Fackrell v.
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987) (Rule
59 motions must be made within tendays after entry
of judgment).
FN2. Although Bischel labeled her motion as a rule
60(b)(7) motion, it is the substance of the motion,
not the caption that is controlling. State v. Parker,
872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 883
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855
P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, the trial
court should have treated the motion as a rule
60(b)(1) motion rather than a rule 60(b)(7) motion
because the substance of the motion challenged the
trial court's definition of "strict compliance"
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Furthermore, the trial court should have treated the
motion as falling under rule 60(b)(1) because that
subsection benefited Bischel. See Parker, 872 P.2d
at 1044 n. 3 (noting court should choose rule 60
subsection that most benefits party seeking relief).
Additionally, Bischel filed her motion within the
three-month time frame required by rule 60(b)(1).
FN3. In dissent. Judge Bench asserts our reliance on
Brittain is erroneous because Brittain interpreted a
different statute. Indeed, Brittain focused on
section 63-30-12 rather than on section 63-30-13.
However, the two sections are identical in their
requirements for directing and delivering notice of
claim. The basic difference between the two
sections is that section 63-30-12 addresses claims
against the state while section 63-30-13 addresses
claims against political subdivisions of the state.
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FN4. For brief discussions of how the doctrine of appeal),
governmental immunity evolved, see Condemarin v.
University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah FN! Bischel's attorney merely alleged that an
1989), and Brittain, 882 P.2d at 668-69. unidentified receptionist told him to file a notice
with McDonald in the county attorney's office. In
FN5. We have also reviewed Bischel's claim for costs an affidavit, the Chief Deputy of the Government
and attorney fees incurred on appeal. We deny the Services Division of the county attorney's office
claim, finding it without merit. See State v. Carter, stated that Trish McDonald was not authorized to
776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (observing court accept notices of claim on behalf of the county
may decline to address arguments without merit on commission.
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EXHIBIT G
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH )
) ss.
County of Salt Lake )
COMES NOW Barbara C. Reissen. affiant, and states under oath as follows:
1. That I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and am over the aae of 21.
2. That I was employed by Robert B. Han. Attorney at Law, at all times stated herein.
3. That on or about the last partof January, 1998,1 was instructed by Mr. Hart to draft
a ''Notice of Claim" (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1), relative to the claim of
Amanda Thimmes against the State of Utah and Utah State University'.
4. That on or about the first of February. 1998, I contacted the Utah State Attorney
General's Office, asking to whom I should address the "Notice of Claim."
5. After beingreferred to three different departments bythe Attorney General's Office.
I iinally spoke with a representative from the Department of Administrative Services. Risk
Management Division. The representative instructed me to send the ''Notice of Claim" directlv to
that office. I was also instructed to address the "Notice of Claim" to Mr. Jim Stefandonakis. as he
was the claims adjuster presently handling the claim.
6. Because of the specific statutory requirements governingthe mailing of the ''Notice
of Claim." I asked the representative if this was a division of the Attorney General's office. I was
told yes.
7. Based upon the information provided to me by this representative. I caused to be
mailed, via Cenified Mail, return receipt requested (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
2). a cops' of the "'Notice of Claim" addressed to Jim Stefandonakis. at the address listed on Exhibit
1.
A2?
DATED this,^2_ d:1>' ofAugust, 1998.
./ )&///*/*L.
Barbara c reissen
ej-'.^^t^^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this rsf) day ofAugust, 1998.
MARILYN E. DAY
mrxwi pvbuc • srm oi uoh
835 EAST 7220 SOLTTH JTD-100
UIDVAL5.UTAH WC47
CCtiU. EXPIRES 10-22-90
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NOTARY PUBLIC
EXHIBIT H
HART & HART
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
349 South 200 East
Suite 110
Sill Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1100
Facsimile: (801) 534-1559
ROBERT BHART, ESQ.
February 6, 1998
Jim Stefandonakis, Claims Adjuster
State ofUtah, Dept. ofAdministrative Services
Division ofRisk Management
5120 State Office Building
SaltLake City UT 84114
George H. Emert, President
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan UT 84322-1400
NOTICE OF CLAIM
Dear Gentlemen:
Pursuant to Utah Code Arm, §63-30-11 (1953, as amended), this letter serves as our
notice ofclaim for injury regarding an automobile/pedestrian accident involving a Utah State
University truck and our client, Amanda Thimmes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This accident occurred on March 17, 1997, at approximately 6:50 a,m. at the intersection
of700 East and 400 North in Logan, Utah. Ms. Thimmes was apedestrian, crossing 700 East
The Utah State University (USU) truck, driven by Haven B. Hendricks, was eastbound on 400
North. At the time Ms. Thimmes reached the center ofthe crosswalk, Mr. Hendricks made a left
hand turn onto 700 East, striking Ms. Thimmes, pushing her north into the roadwav.
Ms. Thimmes sustained sprain and partial tear of the right medial collateral liaament and
bony contusion ofboth the right femoral condyles, right elbow contusion and minor abrasion left
medial knee contusions and right anterior rib contusions.
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tf
Jim Stefandonakis, Claims Adjuster
George H. Emert, President U.S.U.
NOTICE OF CLAIM
February 6, 1998
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Since the accident, Ms. Thimmes has undergone right knee arthroscopic repair. She
continues to experience pain and disability as aresult of the accident and subsequent injuries
NATURE OF CLAIM
On behalfofMs. Thimmes, we assert a claim for damages incurred as a result ofthis
accident, including, but not limited to, present medical bills, future medical care, pain, suffering,
permanent impairment (should one be determined), and loss ofenjoyment oflife.
DAMAGES
To date, Ms. Thimmes has incurred the following bills:
Logan Regional Hospital S 2,482.15
Logan City Ambulance 316.88
Logan Radiology 93.00
Keith Nelson, M.D. 75.00
(Western Medical Inc.)
Charles P. Bean, M.D. 1,725.35
(Tanner Memorial Clinic)
Susan F. Germaine, L.M.T. 1,080.00
Mountain West Physical Therapy 1,155.08
M.W.P.T. Equipment Co., Inc. 50.00
George M, Bennett, M.D., P.C. 342.00
Davis Hospital & Medical Center 3,835.92
Prescription Medication 98 40
TOTAL S 11,253.78
CONCLUSION
We have been communicating with Mr. Stefandonakis regarding this claim and await vour
approval or denial as outlined in U.C.A. §63-30-14.
yd
Jim Stefandonakis, Claims Adjuster
George H. Emert, President U-S.U.
NOTICE OF CLAIM
February 6, 1998
Pace 3
cc: A. Thimmes
7/
Sincerely,
Hart & Hart
ROBERT B. HART
Attorney at Law
EXHIBIT I
S; SENDEE:
• Cdu.plulu Items 1 and'or 2 lor additional Borvtcua /
• Complete Ileum 3, 4a, and 'III
• Print your nam a and address on Iha ravers a of Itil8 (orm bo Ii.... we can return this
card lo you.
•^nach this lorni lo tha IronI ol the mallploca. of on tha bach IIspaca does not
porinll.
• Wntu 'Rolurn Rocolpl Ruquoslod' on Iho mailploce bolow tha article number.
• Tha Holum Huculpt will show lo whom (lie article was delivered and Iha dale
dullwurod.
I also wish to receive ttje
following services (for an
extra tee):
1. D Addressee's Addres
2. • Restricted Delivery
Consult postmaster for fee.
•a 3. Article Addressed to:
a FEB 12MG90
5. Received By; (Print Napie)
t>. Signature: (Addraisea or AgoriI}\
4a. Article Number
Pl^^ ^f-fj
4b. Service Type .
D Registered fe^ Certlfle
D Express Mall Q Insurec
D Return Receipt (or Merchandise • COD \
7. Data of Delivery
8. Addressee's Address (Only Itrequestad
and fee is paid)
or
SENDER:
• Complete Items 1 ancfor 2 lor r~~'•tonal larvlcai.
• Complete Items 3, 4a, and 4b,' '
• Prtnl youf name and address o.. . a revena of Ibis (orm so thai ws can relum INs
card to you.
• Attach ifila (orm lo the fronl ol'lha mallpleca, or on tha back11 (pace ctoeinol
permit.
• Write 'Return Rocelpt Requosled' on Iha mallpleca below tha arllcla number.
• The Relum Receipt will show lo whom the adlcle wa« delivered and tha dale
delivered.
following si ua (for en
extra fee): • -•"
1. • Addressee's, Rddresa
2. • Restricted Delvery '
Consult postmaster torree.
3. Article Addressed to:
t*^«*
4a. Article Number
s. ^7 7&/-y#5
5. Received By. (Print Name)
6. Slgnatijfa^f^rJdrflssee or Agent)
4b. Service Type ' ~~~~_ ™
D Registered fj^ Certified
^ffa Express Mall • Insured
• Return Receipt forMerchandise • COD
7. Date of Delivery
8. Addressee's Address (Only Ifrequested
and fee Is paid)
"^
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